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Notes
LEFEMINE v. WIDEMAN: ENTRENCHING JUDICIAL CONFUSION
AND BECKONING A MORE STREAMLINED ANALYSIS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS IN THE ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST
CONTEXT
BLAKE LAUREN WALSH ∗
In Lefemine v. Wideman, 1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit sought to resolve whether the law enforcement officers who
engaged in impermissible content-based restrictions on Petitioner
Steven Lefemine’s rights under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by restricting a roadside anti-abortion demonstration
2
were entitled to qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit also examined whether the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina
“abused its discretion by failing to rule on [Lefemine’s] request for
declaratory relief[, and] by failing to award [Lefemine] attorney’s
3
fees,” and erred by granting injunctive relief to [Lefemine]. While
4
neither party addressed the First Amendment issue on appeal, the
Copyright © 2013 by Blake Lauren Walsh.
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1. 672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012).
2. Id. at 297.
3. Id. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Lefemine with respect to his First Amendment claim but held that the law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 624, 627 (D.S.C.
2010), aff’d, Lefemine v. Wideman 672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds,
133 S. Ct. 9 (2012).
4. Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 297 (“[N]o one challenges the fundamental conclusion that
[the] Defendants’ actions were an impermissible content-based restriction on [the] Plaintiff’s First Amendment[] rights.”). In accepting this “fundamental conclusion,” the Fourth
Circuit “pass[ed] no judgment on whether the district court was correct in its determination.” Id.
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Fourth Circuit noted, albeit briefly, that at the time of Lefemine’s
demonstration in 2005, case law from the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States was unclear as to how courts should
review the constitutionality of restrictions on speech when faced with
5
restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech. The district court, how6
ever, had explored the issue in greater detail. The Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded the officers were entitled to qualified immunity
7
and that the district court had not abused its discretion.
Indeed, each party accepted on appeal the district court’s conclusion that the officers’ actions violated Lefemine’s First Amendment
8
rights to freedom of speech and assembly. In framing its qualified
immunity analysis, however, the Fourth Circuit relied on ambiguous
precedent surrounding the distinction between content-based and
9
content-neutral restrictions on speech. This conflicting case law, as
the district court and the Fourth Circuit in Lefemine articulated, lends
support to the view that there is no conceptual room for a two-tiered
scheme of content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech
10
Due to the emotionally
in the context of anti-abortion speech.
charged and socially divisive nature of abortion, the two-tiered
scheme only sows judicial confusion and furthers jurisprudential inconsistency. Application of a single strict scrutiny standard to restrictions on anti-abortion speech, while certainly not infallible, would
11
help to resolve this ambiguity. In the end, the impetus for applying
any standard to review restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech
must hold fast to the principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s most
12
prominent trio of abortion cases—Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood of
13
14
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and Gonzales v. Carhart —because
15
of the unique nature of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.
5. See id. at 299–301 (citing ambiguous case law from the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court concerning the question of whether requesting that demonstrators remove
protest signs containing “large, graphic photographs” constitutes “an impermissible infringement of their First Amendment rights”).
6. Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 620–24 (reasoning that the “blanket ban” on all graphic signs was not “narrowly tailored” to the purported “compelling interest” in protecting
young children from graphic visual displays and concluding that the ban violated Lefemine’s First Amendment rights).
7. Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 301–04.
8. Id. at 297.
9. See infra Part IV.A. Part IV.A will likewise address how the district court, in framing
its analysis and making its determination about Lefemine’s First Amendment freedoms of
speech and assembly, relied on the same backdrop of ambiguous precedent.
10. See infra Part IV.B.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

1380

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1378

I. THE CASE
On November 3, 2005, in Greenwood County, South Carolina,
Steven C. Lefemine endeavored to stage a Christian pro-life demonstration at the “busiest intersection in [the] County.” 16 Lefemine was
the sole proprietor of the Columbia Christians for Life Counsel
17
(”CCL”), an anti-abortion organization. Twenty other “‘like-minded
persons,’” accompanying Lefemine and preaching and carrying signs,
intended “‘to shock the consciences of those who s[aw] the signs to
18
During the demonstration, Lieutenant
the horror of abortion.’”
Randy Miles of the Greenwood County Sheriff’s Office notified Major
Lonnie Smith “of complaints that had been received from motorists
19
driving near the intersection.” Lt. Miles then informed Lefemine
“that he ‘had [received] several complaints about the graphic photo20
graphs and [that] this was creating a disturbance in the traffic flow.’”
Thereafter, Major Smith and Deputy Brandon Strickland arrived on
21
the scene of the protest demonstration to investigate.
Major Smith instructed Lefemine and the other demonstrators to
remove the signs because they were “offensive,” but told them they
22
could continue their protest without the signs. Lefemine responded
that “[b]eing offensive is not a basis for violating First Amendment
23
rights” and argued that his signs were not obscene. Following his
conversation with Major Smith, Lefemine and the other demonstra24
tors removed their signs, ended their protest, and left the scene.
14. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617 (D.S.C. 2010) (citations omitted),
aff’d, Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S.
Ct. 9 (2012).
17. Id.
18. Id. (citation omitted). In particular, these signs “‘depict[ed] aborted babies.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
19. Id. (citation omitted). Lt. Miles informed Major Smith of one particular complaint from a “mother [who] called saying that her son ‘was in the backseat screaming, crying because [he] had seen those signs.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 617–18 (citation omitted).
21. Id. (citation omitted). Major Smith “observed a number of individuals holding
signs and megaphones.” Id. at 618 (citation omitted). Before he approached the CCL
demonstrators, Major Smith reported the events to Chief Deputy Mike Frederick. Id. at
617–18 (citation omitted). Chief Deputy Frederick instructed Major Smith “‘to tell [the
protesters] that they could continue to protest but they would either have to put away or
take down the signs or . . . possibly be ticketed for breach of peace.’” Id. at 618.
22. Id. Specifically, Major Smith told Lefemine: “This is offensive because you’ve got
small children—you’ve got different ones that are seeing this. We have had so many complaints about people that this is offensive.” Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 619 (citation omitted).
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One year later, on November 13, 2006, “an attorney from the National Legal Foundation (‘NLF’) wrote a letter to Sheriff Dan Wideman” of the Greenwood County Sheriff’s Office and to Chief Gerald
Brooks of the City of Greenwood Police Department to forewarn the
officers that CCL volunteers planned to return to the Greenwood ar25
ea to “‘highlight[] the national tragedy of abortion.’” The letter declared that any disruption of CCL’s efforts would leave CCL with no
other option than “‘to pursue all available legal remedies without fur26
ther notice.’” Chief Brooks responded “that CCL was welcome to
visit the community and properly exercise their [First Amendment]
27
rights.” In a separate response, however, Chief Deputy Mike Frederick cautioned NLF “that Major Smith’s response in 2005 was based on
28
CCL’s methodology not their content.” If any officer observed behavior similar to that present at the November 2005 protest, Chief
Deputy Mike Frederick further warned, the demonstrators would be
ordered to cease their behavior or alternatively face criminal charg29
Out of fear of being subjected to criminal sanctions from
es.
Greenwood County, Lefemine and the other protesters conducted
their demonstrations on the Greenwood City side of the intersection
30
on November 26, 2006 and on another occasion in 2007.
On October 31, 2008, Lefemine, on behalf of himself and CCL,
filed suit against Sheriff Wideman, former Chief Deputy Frederick,
Major Smith, and Deputy Strickland (collectively, the “defendants”)
31
alleging violations of his First Amendment rights. On April 5, 2010,
Lefemine and the defendants filed cross-motions for summary judg32
ment. The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina
33
held a hearing on the cross-motions on June 23, 2010.
34
Lefemine brought his lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
damages, as well as “injunctive and declaratory relief[,] for the viola-

25. Id. (citation omitted).
26. Id. (citation omitted).
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id. (citations omitted).
31. Id. Lefemine subsequently filed an amended complaint, adding Sheriff Tony Davis as a defendant. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 619–20.
34. Section 1983 permits an individual to bring a lawsuit against a person who, while
acting “under color of any [state law],” violated the individual’s constitutional rights. See
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
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tion of his rights of free speech, peaceable assembly, and the free ex35
ercise of religion” under the First Amendment. Lefemine argued
that the defendants’ demand that the CCL demonstrators remove
their signs was “improperly based on” the public’s reaction to the con36
In response, the defendants argued that
tent of the expression.
Lefemine had failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights
and emphasized “that their restrictions on CCL’s speech constituted a
37
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.” The district court
reviewing the totality of the evidence within the record, found that
the defendants’ restriction on Lefemine’s and CCL’s speech was
38
based on content. The court highlighted that because “[c]ontentbased restrictions on speech ‘are presumptively invalid and subject to
39
strict scrutiny,’” the defendants’ restriction must be narrowly tai40
lored to achieve a compelling state interest. The defendants alleged
that the government had a compelling interest in traffic safety and
41
protecting young children, but the district court noted two weaknesses in the defendants’ argument. First, the district court observed
that Major Smith never mentioned traffic safety in his conversation
with Lefemine on November 3, 2005; second, the district court
acknowledged that a blanket ban on all graphic images to protect
small children failed the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny
42
test. The district court then granted Lefemine’s motion for summary judgment as to his First Amendment claims based on the free43
doms of speech and assembly.
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”).
35. Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 620–21 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 620 (citation omitted). The district court noted that a state’s right to restrict
private expression in traditional public forums is limited, observing that, while the state
“‘may impose reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions . . . it may
regulate [private expression] only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to
serve a compelling state interest.’” Id. at 620–21 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)). For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on protected speech, see infra
Part II.A.
38. Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 621. The district court further noted that the defendants confused “viewpoint neutrality” with “content neutrality,” reasoning that “their restriction [wa]s content-neutral because it was not motivated by disapproval or disagreement with Plaintiff’s pro-life stance.” Id.
39. Id. at 622 (quoting Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009)).
40. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
41. Id. at 622-23.
42. Id. at 623–24.
43. Id. at 624. Lefemine also sought summary judgment on his free exercise of religion claim. He claimed that “‘[i]n the exercise of his religious beliefs, CCL either displays
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In their cross-motion for summary judgment, the “Defendants allege[d] that they [we]re entitled to qualified immunity because there
was no clearly established law indicating that their conduct would vio44
late [Lefemine]’s constitutional rights.” Relying on U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, the district court first established that
“‘[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally
are . . . shielded from liability for civil damages [only] insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
45
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” The district court then emphasized that the Supreme Court’s two-part test for
46
resolving qualified immunity claims—first proposed in Saucier v. Katz
and later suggested as a discretionary standard in Pearson v. Calla47
han —should guide the qualified immunity analysis in the present
48
case.
Applying the Saucier test and finding a constitutional violation of
Lefemine’s First Amendment rights, the district court then reasoned
that the primary question “becomes whether a reasonable officer
could have believed that prohibiting demonstrators from displaying
large signs containing pictures of dismembered, aborted fetuses at a
major intersection was lawful, in light of clearly established First
49
Amendment law and the information they possessed.” The district
court emphasized that in November 2005, no clearly established law
or supervises the display of pro-life signs.’” Id. While Lefemine’s free exercise of religion
claim falls outside the scope of this Note, the district court similarly granted Lefemine’s
motion for summary judgment with respect to this claim. Id. at 625.
44. Id. (citation omitted).
45. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)). The district court
acknowledged that, as a practical matter, whether an officer is protected by qualified immunity “turns on the objective legal reasonableness of [his] action[s].” Id. (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the district court
noted that “‘[c]learly established for purposes of qualified immunity means that [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson, 526
U.S. at 614–15).
46. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
47. 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
48. See Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 625–26 (“The court finds that the Saucier procedure is worthwhile in the instant case . . . .”). The district court observed that the two-part
test for resolving qualified immunity claims requires that the plaintiff first establish a constitutional violation, and only then can the court “decide[] whether the right at issue was
‘clearly established’ at the time of” the alleged violation. Id. at 625 (quoting Pearson, 555
U.S. at 232) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court noted that, while Pearson adopted the two-part test from Saucier, the Pearson Court also established that district
court judges should be given latitude in exercising their own judgment regarding which of
the two qualified immunity prongs to address first in a particular case. Id. (citing Pearson,
555 U.S. at 236).
49. Id. at 626.
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existed in the Fourth Circuit addressing the extent to which officers
may prohibit the use of photographs depicting aborted fetuses in
50
public forums. The district court concluded that, in light of the specific facts of the instant case, the current state of First Amendment
law, and the general knowledge the officers possessed when they acted, “it was not unreasonable for Defendants to believe that their pro51
hibition was lawful.” As a result, the district court granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on the qualified
immunity claim, determining that the defendants were immune from
52
suit in their individual and official capacities.
Lefemine and the defendants filed cross-appeals to the Fourth
53
Circuit challenging different portions of the district court’s opinion,
but neither party challenged the basic premise that the “Defendants’
actions were an impermissible content-based restriction on [Lefem54
ine]’s First Amendment[] rights.”
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly
form the bedrock of American democracy. 55 As the Supreme Court
56
recently re-affirmed in Snyder v. Phelps, “[t]he First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
57
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”
Nevertheless, the Snyder Court also acknowledged that “‘[n]ot all
speech is of equal First Amendment importance’” and that “where
matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment
58
protections are often less rigorous.”
With regard to protest speech in particular, the interweaving of
the right to protest with First Amendment protections first emerged
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 625, 627. Based on a review of “the totality of the facts in this case,” the district court denied Lefemine’s request for attorney’s fees. Id. at 627.
53. Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds,
133 S. Ct. 9 (2012).
54. Id. at 297.
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“‘If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989))).
56. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
57. Id. at 1215 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
58. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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59

during the labor union protests in the early twentieth century. In
60
Thornhill v. Alabama, the Supreme Court further acknowledged the
61
distinction between violent and peaceful protests. More than forty
years later, the Court elaborated on the distinction between peaceful
protests and those involving violent and threatening conduct in
62
The Court acknowledged
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company.
that the First Amendment protects “‘the opportunity to persuade
63
[others] to action, not merely to describe facts.’” Claiborne involved
an NAACP-staged boycott of white merchants stemming from widespread dissatisfaction with an inadequate response to “a list of particularized demands for racial equality and integration” presented to
white elected officials in Claiborne County, Mississippi; the business
owners subsequently filed suit “to recover losses caused by the boycott
64
and to enjoin future boycott activity.” The Claiborne Court drew upon its decision in Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing
65
v. City of Berkeley, which it decided only a year prior, to support its determination that the petitioners’ boycott involved constitutionally
66
protected activity.
59. See Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (“Society itself
is an organization, and does not object to organizations for social, religious, business, and
all legal purposes. The law, therefore, recognizes the right of workingmen to unite and to
invite others to join their ranks, thereby making available the strength, influence, and
power that come from such association.”).
60. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
61. See id. at 104 (“[T]he group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely on a showing
that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interests.”). In
Thornhill, the petitioner participated in a picket line at his place of employment in violation of an Alabama statute that made it unlawful to picket near a place of business “without a just cause or legal excuse.” Id. at 91–92, 94–95. The Supreme Court held that the
Alabama statute was unconstitutional because it foreclosed any and all means by which a
protester could peacefully disseminate his views to the public on a matter of public concern. See id. at 98–99, 104–05 (“[The statute] has been applied by the State courts so as to
prohibit a single individual from walking slowly and peacefully back and forth on the public sidewalk in front of the premises of an employer, without speaking to anyone . . . .”).
62. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 916 (1982) (stating that
the states do not have a “right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as that found in
the boycott in this case,” but noting that “[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence”).
63. Id. at 910 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)). The Court emphasized that “[t]hrough speech, assembly, and petition—rather than through riot or revolution—petitioners sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them as
second-class citizens.” Id. at 912.
64. Id. at 889.
65. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
66. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 907 (observing that “[t]he black citizens named as Defendants in this action banded together and collectively expressed their dissatisfaction with
a social structure that had denied them rights to equal treatment and respect” and that
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While First Amendment protection of protest speech is certainly
67
not absolute, the content-based versus content-neutral distinction
for determining the permissibility of speech restrictions places certain
limits on the government’s ability to impede otherwise constitutional68
ly protected speech. The interplay between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech has unique implications for antiabortion protests due to the emotionally charged nature of the top69
ic. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized certain categories of government interests that are sufficiently compelling to justify
70
intrusions on protected speech. Although the trio of Roe, Casey, and
Gonzales does not fall within the realm of First Amendment jurisprudence, the cases will frame the discussion in this Note because these
prominent cases notably address the relationship between the government’s interest in protecting human life, on the one hand, and a
pregnant woman’s constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy,
71
on the other hand.
A. The Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Distinction Limits the
Government’s Power to Impede Speech
The government’s ability to restrict expressive speech in public
72
forums is limited. As the Supreme Court re-articulated in Hudgens v.
73
NLRB, “streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are
so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights
that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot
74
Nevertheless,
constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely.”
the fact that the public commonly traffics a particular area of public
property does not automatically transform the property into a “public
forum” within which the government’s ability to restrict expressive

“th[is] practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a common
end is deeply embedded in the American political process” (quoting Citizens Against Rent
Control, 454 U.S. at 294)).
67. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The protections afforded by the
First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”).
68. See infra Part II.A.
69. See infra Part II.B.
70. See infra Part II.C.
71. See infra Part II.D.
72. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“In
places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”).
73. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
74. Id. at 515 (quoting Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968)).
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speech is more circumscribed. In a traditional public forum, namely
streets, public sidewalks, and parks, a state “may impose reasonable,
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions . . . but it may
regulate expressive content only if such a restriction is necessary, and
76
narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest.” A government
restriction on speech in a public forum must satisfy four elements to
withstand the level of scrutiny applied to content-neutral time, place,
77
and manner (“TPM”) restrictions on speech. The standard for TPM
restrictions occupies “what has come to be known as ‘intermediate
78
scrutiny.’” The intermediate scrutiny standard for content-neutral
TPM restrictions stands in stark contrast to the strict scrutiny standard
79
applied to content-based restrictions on protected speech.
Case law addressing content-based restrictions on speech is not
limited to discerning an intent to limit speech; instead, case law suggests that restrictions on the content of speech occur along a fluid
spectrum. At the most prejudicial end of the spectrum are viewpointbased restrictions, whereby a law carries a specific prejudice toward a
80
The “symbolic
certain point of view related to a given topic.

75. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (disagreeing with the argument
“that whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the Government, then that place becomes a ‘public forum’ for purposes of the
First Amendment” and instead declaring that “[s]uch a principle of constitutional law has
never existed, and does not exist now”).
76. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995).
77. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (“[T]he government may enforce
reasonable [TPM] regulations as long as the restrictions ‘are [(1)] content-neutral, are
[(2)] narrowly tailored to serve a [(3)] significant government interest, and [(4)] leave
open ample alternative channels of communication.’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S.
at 45)).
78. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 791 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also id. (further explaining that
TPM restrictions on speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which is the “midway between the ‘strict scrutiny’ demanded for content-based regulation of speech and the ‘rational basis’ standard that is applied . . . to government regulation of nonspeech activities”).
79. Compare Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (“The state may also enforce regulations
of the [TPM] of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”), with id. (“For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion [in a traditional public
forum] it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”).
80. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers
on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.” (internal citation omitted)).
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81

speech” line of cases is particularly illustrative of viewpoint discrimi82
nation. Regulations based on viewpoint discrimination are “‘pre83
sumptively invalid.’” On the other end of the spectrum are the least
84
As the Suprejudicial restrictions—content-neutral regulations.
preme Court has noted, “the content neutrality principle is [generally] invoked when the government has imposed restrictions on speech
85
Thus, “[t]he content neutrality
related to an entire subject area.”
principle can be seen as an outgrowth of the core First Amendment
86
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination.” According to the Supreme Court, the primary inquiry shaping the content neutrality determination “is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
87
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”
Despite the seemingly fluid spectrum of content-related restrictions on speech, Supreme Court precedent in the area is at best
88
unclear and ambiguous. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
for example, the Court acknowledged that the content-related analy-

81. The Supreme Court noted in Virginia v. Black that “[t]he First Amendment affords
protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.” 538 U.S. 343, 358
(2003). But see id. at 361, 363 (noting that the protection is not absolute and determining
that even though “cross burning is symbolic expression,” Virginia was constitutionally
permitted “to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate”).
82. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510–11
(1969) (declaring unconstitutional a decision by school officials to prohibit students from
wearing black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam even though other similarly political symbolic forms of protest were permitted). But see Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (“The First
Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate
because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation.”).
83. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 353 (2009) (“Restrictions on
speech based on its content are ‘presumptively invalid’ and subject to strict scrutiny.” (citation omitted)).
84. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Svc. Comm’n of N.Y, 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980) (noting that TPM “regulations must be ‘applicable to all speech irrespective of content’” and that “[a] restriction that regulates only the [TPM] of speech may be imposed so
long as it is reasonable” (citation omitted)).
85. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983) (emphasis added).
86. Id.; see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 447 U.S. at 536 (“Governmental action
that regulates speech on the basis of its subject matter ‘slip[s] from the neutrality of time,
place, and circumstance into a concern about content.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972))); see also Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (“The
central problem with Chicago’s ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in
terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school’s labormanagement dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited.”).
87. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added); see also
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (“Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.” (emphasis added)).
88. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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89

sis is not straightforward in application. With few exceptions, however, the Court has treated laws as content-based that explicitly classify
expression on the basis of discrete categories of subject matter or
90
viewpoints. The Court did, however, carve out a limited exception
91
to this general rule in Young v. American Mini Theatres —the Court
referenced the “secondary effects” doctrine to justify a zoning ordinance that differentiated between movie theaters that did and did not
92
“exhibit sexually explicit ‘adult’ movies.” Ten years later, in City of
93
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court relied on Young and reaffirmed that a neutral justification can render an otherwise facially
94
Specifically, the Renton Court
discriminatory law content-neutral.
acknowledged that the City of Renton’s “‘predominate’ intent” was
“to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property
values, and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the
city’s] neighborhoods,’” which the Court determined was sufficient
justification for classifying an ordinance “that prohibits adult motion
picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential
zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school” as

89. Id. at 642–43 (“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task. . . . [W]hile a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary
to such a showing in all cases. Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be
enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.” (internal citations
omitted)).
90. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (concluding that the Communications Decency Act, or “CDA[,] applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace[, and
t]hus . . . is a content-based blanket restriction on speech”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
321 (1988) (noting that a District of Columbia law prohibiting displays of signs critical of
foreign government within 500 feet of the embassies of those governments was contentbased because it “[wa]s justified only by reference to the content of the speech”).
91. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
92. Id. at 52. See also id. at 71 n.34 (“The [Detroit] Common Council’s determination
was that a concentration of ‘adult’ movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other types of
films. It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the
dissemination of ‘offensive’ speech.” (plurality opinion)). For a more recent judicial framing of the secondary effects doctrine—and operating in a similar context—see City of Erie
v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278, 295 (2000) (addressing the constitutionality of a city ordinance making it a crime to appear in public “in a state of nudity” and noting that “there
is nothing objectionable about a city passing a general ordinance to ban public nudity and
at the same time recognizing that one specific occurrence of public nudity—nude erotic
dancing—is particularly problematic because it produces harmful secondary effects”).
93. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
94. Id. at 46, 48 (noting that “the resolution of this case is largely dictated by our decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,” and that “the Renton ordinance is completely
consistent with our definition of ‘content-neutral’ speech regulations as those that ‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’” (citations omitted)).
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95

content-neutral instead of content-based. Three years later, in Ward
96
v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court invoked Renton and clarified that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling considera97
tion” in any content-related analysis.
While the Supreme Court has upheld as content neutral laws
98
supported by purely content-free justifications, the Court has also
upheld as content neutral laws with relatively clear message-related
99
This is particularly evident in the context of antijustifications.
abortion protests. For example, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,
100
Inc., the Court emphasized concerns with patient privacy and psychological well-being in “hold[ing] that the establishment of a 36-foot
buffer zone on a public street [outside of an abortion clinic] from
which [anti-abortion] demonstrators [we]re excluded” was constitu101
Three years after Madsen, in
tional under the First Amendment.
102
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, the Court concluded
that the governmental interest in “protecting a woman’s freedom to
seek pregnancy-related services . . . justif[ied] an appropriately tailored injunction to secure unimpeded physical access to [abortion]
103
clinics;” the Court’s conclusion conflicted with the protesters’ claim
that the injunction was based purely on “disagreement with the message being conveyed,” in part because “the condition on the [counselors’] freedom to espouse [their views] within the buffer zone [was in
fact] the result of their own previous harassment and intimidation of
104
patients.”
Although it is difficult to deduce a bright-line rule from the Supreme Court’s content-related speech jurisprudence, it remains un95. Id. at 43, 48.
96. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
97. Id. at 791–92 (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48)).
98. See, e.g., id. at 792 (upholding a municipal noise regulation as content-neutral because “the principal justification for the sound-amplification guideline is the city’s desire
to control noise levels . . . and to avoid undue intrusion into residential areas and other
areas of the park”).
99. Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (acknowledging a neutral interest in
“unimpeded access to health care facilities” and an arguably content-related interest in
“the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests”).
100. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
101. Id. at 757, 768 (observing that the state had a “strong interest in residential privacy . . . applied by analogy to medical privacy” and in protecting “not only the psychological,
but also the physical, well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance” (citations omitted)).
102. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
103. Id. at 376.
104. Id. at 384–85.
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disputed that certain categories of speech do not receive First
Amendment protection. This category includes speech involving ob105
scene materials, and speech likely to incite immediate violence and
106
Regarding obscenity, the Supreme Court in Miller v.
cause injury.
107
California established more concrete standards for judging whether
material should be regarded as obscene, and thus not constitutionally
protected. Under the Miller framework:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the “average person, applying contemporary community
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts
or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct . . . ;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious lit108
erary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Obscenity occupies a particularly limited category of speech, the
restriction of which has very rarely triggered a constitutional problem.
Otherwise, as the Supreme Court has noted, “[a]ll ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin109
ion—have the full protection of the guarantees.”
B. The Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Distinction Has Important
Implications for Anti-Abortion Protests
Anti-abortion protests implicate the important distinction between content-neutral and content-based restrictions on speech. The
analysis in this area is somewhat muddied because the emotionally
charged nature of certain speech, including anti-abortion protests,
105. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 n.1, 492 (1957) (upholding a federal statute criminalizing the mailing of any “obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book,
pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character” against a First Amendment challenge); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763
(1982) (recognizing that child pornography constitutes another category receiving less
than full constitutional protection under the First Amendment); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (reasoning that “the States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole”).
106. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the . . . insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” (footnotes omitted)).
107. 413 U.S. 15 (1973), abrogation recognized by State v. Claiborne, 818 P.2d 285, 289
(Idaho 1991).
108. Id. at 24.
109. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
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makes it difficult to escape restrictions motivated by content. Content-neutral restrictions do, however, exist and have typically included
110
justified public nuisance regulations. In Kovacs v. Cooper, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance from Trenton, New
Jersey that prohibited trucks and other instruments from emitting
“loud and raucous noises,” reasoning that the regulation was ad111
In the antidressed to the “comfort and convenience” of citizens.
abortion protest context, other courts have likewise characterized restrictions targeted at protecting listeners from loud and unwelcome
112
noise as content-neutral.
Additionally, while TPM restrictions fall squarely into the catego113
ry of content-neutral regulations, the inclusion of certain forms of
symbolic speech in this category has sown further confusion surrounding the proper test courts should apply when distinguishing be114
tween “symbolic speech” and “pure speech.” Nevertheless, contentneural regulations of speech must still be justified by reference to the
traditional TPM test, to a reformulated version, or to a combination
115
thereof. In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court upheld
O’Brien’s conviction for burning his draft card as a form of protest
against the Vietnam War, articulating a four-part variation of the tra116
ditional TPM test.
110. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
111. Id. at 86, 88; see also id. at 88 (“The preferred position of freedom of speech in a
society that cherishes liberty for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims
by citizens to comfort and convenience. To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the
rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.”).
112. See, e.g., Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 440–42, 453–54, 569 A.2d 604, 606, 612
(1990) (upholding the application of a Maryland statute prohibiting willful disturbance of
neighborhoods “when used by the State to limit the volume of speech” of an anti-abortion
protester against a First Amendment challenge on the grounds that “the statute [went] no
further than to afford content-neutral protection to the captive auditor . . . who cannot
avoid continuing, unreasonably loud and disruptive communications emanating from the
street”).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 72–78.
114. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (emphasizing that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not provide “the same kind of freedom to those who would
communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and
highways as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech”);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government generally has a freer hand
in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting written or spoken word.”).
115. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
116. Id. at 369, 372. The four-part test from O’Brien for determining whether a government regulation in the symbolic speech context is constitutional states:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [(1)] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [(2)] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [(3)] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and [(4)] if the incidental restriction on alleged
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Then, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court outlined the following standard for determining the constitutionality of TPM restrictions: “a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but it need not be the least restrictive
117
It remains unclear whether
or least intrusive means of doing so.”
the four-part formulation from O’Brien is more or less restrictive than
the TPM test articulated in Ward.
Compounding the confusion stemming from the Supreme
Court’s adoption of varying formulations of the TPM test, the Court
in Madsen appears to have created a TPM test specifically tailored to
abortion cases—this test requires that the restriction on speech “burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government in118
Justice Scalia opined in his dissent in Madsen that the difterest.”
ference between the old standard and the new standard was subtle yet
profound, labeling the new test “intermediate-intermediate scruti119
ny.”
The anti-abortion protest context provides a unique forum for
judicial interpretation of content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech. Restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech
have in large part been justified as content neutral on the basis of
120
secondary effects. In Medlin v. Palmer, for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance that prohibited the use of loudspeakers within a
certain range of any school in session, single-family or multiple family
dwellings, hospitals, or other medical facilities providing outpatient
121
In considering anti-abortion activists’ First Amendment
services.
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id. at 377.
117. 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
118. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (emphasis added).
The Madsen Court reinforced the notion that “when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous.” Id. at 765. Madsen involved a constitutional challenge to a multi-faceted injunction
prohibiting anti-abortion protestors from “demonstrating in certain places and in various
ways outside of a health clinic that performs abortions.” Id. at 757.
119. See id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(“The Court . . . creates, brand new for this abortion-related case, an additional standard that is
(supposedly) ‘somewhat more stringent,’ than intermediate scrutiny, yet not as ‘rigorous,’
as strict scrutiny. . . . [P]erhaps we could call it intermediate-intermediate scrutiny. The
difference between it and intermediate scrutiny . . . is frankly too subtle for me to describe . . . .” (emphasis added)).
120. 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989).
121. Id. at 1086, 1092.
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challenge to the ordinance, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ordinance was specifically tailored “to protect people suffering from ill
health, the aged, and school children from the nuisance of loud122
Furthermore, in
speaker noise” in spite of the message conveyed.
123
Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Advocates for Life, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a preliminary injunction, with certain modifications, that
regulated anti-abortion protests outside of a women’s health center
124
The court reasoned that the ordinance
that provided abortions.
was content-neutral because it did not specifically target the views espoused by the demonstrators, but rather protected the clinic from
125
physical intimidation and noise. Courts have thus recognized that,
in the anti-abortion protest context, there is a special need to carefully balance the protester’s right to free speech with the public’s desire
to be free from unwanted invasions of personal privacy and safety.
C. The Supreme Court Recognizes Discrete Categories of Government
Interests That Support Restricting Otherwise Constitutionally
Protected Speech
The Supreme Court has recognized certain government interests
that justify restricting speech that would otherwise be protected by the
First Amendment. These interests include, among others, protecting
126
127
residential privacy, protecting normal school activity, and regulat128
ing the use of public streets for the protection of personal safety.
122. Id. at 1090; see also, e.g., id. (“The ordinance makes no reference whatsoever to the
content of speech . . . .”).
123. 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988).
124. Id. at 683–84, 686–87.
125. Id. at 686.
126. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 486 (1988) (concluding that an ordinance
that prohibited “focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence”
was constitutional on the grounds that the picketers’ “activity nonetheless inherently and
offensively intrudes on residential privacy[ because t]he devastating effect of targeted
picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt”).
127. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972) (upholding an “antinoise ordinance” that prohibited willfully disturbing school sessions while on grounds adjacent to a school, reasoning that the “ordinance imposes no such restriction on expressive
activity before or after the school session, while the student/faculty ‘audience’ enters and
leaves the school”).
128. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (“The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in
the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but
rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order . . . .”); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (explaining that “[m]unicipal authorities . . . have the duty to
keep their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property”
and that “[s]o long as legislation . . . does not abridge the constitutional liberty of one
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Regulating anti-abortion protests raises similarly important interests.
Abortion clinics are hotspots for anti-abortion protests, and courts
have thus articulated two important governmental interests operating
within this framework: (1) the interest in keeping streets and side129
walks free from obstruction and (2) the interest in prohibiting con130
In Part II.D, this
duct that disrupts the provision of medical care.
Note addresses how Roe, Casey and Gonzales have permitted increased
state interference with a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy on the basis of two additional government interests: (1) protecting
the potentiality of human life, and (2) protecting the pregnant wom131
an’s health.
Under Ward, to restrict expressive speech that would otherwise
be constitutionally protected, the restriction (1) must be “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” and (2) must
“leave open ample alternative means for communication of the in132
According to the Supreme Court, “[a] statute is narformation.”
rowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact
133
To pass muster under
source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”
O’Brien, however, “an incidental burden on speech [must be] no
greater than is essential” and “the neutral regulation [must] pro-

rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech or the distribution of literature, [the State] may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets.”); see also
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of a Mississippi statute that prohibited picketing insofar as the picketing “‘unreasonably interfere[d]
with free ingress or egress to or from any public premises[, including] courthouses’” and
also “‘unreasonably interfere[d] with free use of public streets’”).
129. See, e.g., N.Y. State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1343 (2d Cir.
1989) (describing the protesters who attempted to block “ingress and egress” to the abortion clinics as “trespassers without right, constitutional or otherwise, to be there” and reasoning that, “[i]nsofar as appellants’ rights of free speech were exercised in close proximity to individual women entering or leaving the clinics so as to tortiously assault or harass
them, appellants’ rights ended where those women’s rights began”).
130. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708–09, 719–20 (2000) (reasoning that
Colorado’s interest in protecting women’s privacy and ensuring meaningful access to abortion clinics “[we]re unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ speech”); see also Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 666 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (explaining that verbal harassment of women entering and leaving abortion clinics
results in increased anxiety for these women, which could in turn impact the women’s
abortion decision as well as the safety and efficacy of the procedure).
131. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 767–68 (1994) (acknowledging “that the State has a strong interest in protecting a woman’s freedom to seek
lawful medical or counseling services in connection with her pregnancy”).
132. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
133. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (citation omitted).
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mote[] a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
134
effectively absent the regulation.”
Despite the permissibility of restrictions on speech, “[t]he First
Amendment protects the right of every citizen to ‘reach the minds of
135
willing listeners.’” As the Court has acknowledged, “‘to do so there
136
In the
must be opportunity to win [willing listeners’] attention.’”
anti-abortion protest context, however, protesters may not effectively
block all access to abortion clinics as a form of protest, for such an
overt action would impede the delivery of basic and essential medical
137
services. Still, courts have struck down restrictions on anti-abortion
protest speech on the grounds that the ordinance or statute at issue
prohibited any and all means by which the protesters could reasona138
bly reach their target audience.
D. Roe, Casey, and Gonzales Permit State Interference into a Woman’s
Right to Terminate Her Pregnancy in the Name of Maternal Health
and Potential Life
139
In the aftermath of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court gradually
redefined a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy. In Roe, the
Supreme Court defined a woman’s decision to terminate her preg140
nancy as a fundamental right. The Court went on to note that gov-

134. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687–89 (1985) (discussing O’Brien and
its progeny).
135. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981)
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)).
136. Id. (quoting Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87).
137. See Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918, 930 (Wash. 1986) (“In the absence of a place
restriction, women visiting the clinic for abortion-related services would be forced to walk
a gauntlet of placard-carrying anti-abortionists.”).
138. See, e.g., Chico Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194, 235–36,
246 (Cal. Ct. App., 3d Dist. 1989) (affirming the lower court’s decision to deny the Women’s Health Center injunctive relief excluding anti-abortion protesters “from ‘any vantage
point from which clients entering the [clinic] can be identified’ on Saturdays when abortions are performed” on the grounds that “ample alternative channels of communication
do not exist if a speaker’s target audience is altogether insulated from the speaker’s message[, which] is the case here[ because t]he Center performs abortions only on Saturdays”). In Scully, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District reasoned
that, by excluding the protesters from demonstrating on the only day when abortions were
performed, the health center effectively cut off any and all alternative means by which the
protest organization could reach its intended audience. See id. at 246 (“The Center made
no showing that Defendants had any means of reaching their target audience—women
obtaining abortions—if Defendants were excluded from the vicinity of the Center on Saturdays.”).
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140. See id. at 152–53 (observing “that only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy” and determining that “[t]his right of privacy . . . is broad enough to en-
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ernment interference with this fundamental right “may be justified
only by ‘a compelling state interest’ and that legislative enactments
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
141
at stake.” The Court noted that a fetus is not a “person” within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that a “fetus’s
142
The Roe
right to life” is not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
Court confirmed, however, that the State has two important and legitimate interests at stake in the abortion context—(1) “protecting the
potentiality of human life” and (2) “preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman”—that become “compelling” at a cer143
Regarding the state’s intain point during a woman’s pregnancy.
terest in protecting “potential life,” the Court emphasized that “the
‘compelling’ point is at viability . . . because the fetus then presumably
144
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”
Regarding the state’s interest in protecting “the health of the mother,” the Court concluded that “the ‘compelling point’ . . . is at the end
of the first trimester . . . because of the now-established medical fact
that . . . until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may
145
The Supreme Court
be less than mortality in normal childbirth.”
established a trimester framework to explain the tangible points at
which the state interests became compelling and to justify state intervention into a woman’s otherwise fundamental right to terminate her
146
pregnancy.

compass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” (internal citation
omitted)).
141. Id. at 155–56 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 157 (noting that “[t]he Constitution does not define ‘person’ in so many
words . . . [b]ut [that] in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has
application only postnatally” and affirmatively concluding that “the word ‘person,’ as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn” (footnote omitted)).
143. Id. at 162–63.
144. Id. at 163.
145. Id.
146. The Court’s trimester framework included the following distinct stages:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.
Id. at 164–65.
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Nearly twenty years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
147
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court once again addressed a
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy. The Casey Court reaf148
firmed the three core principles established in Roe, while a plurality
of the Court modified other portions of the Roe opinion, specifically
149
The Casey plurality abandoned Roe’s trithe trimester framework.
mester framework and instead embraced the undue burden standard
for determining the permissibility of regulating a woman’s right to
150
In doing so, the plurality also vested
terminate her pregnancy.
151
states with greater power to regulate that right. In sum, a plurality
of the Court determined that four of the five provisions of the Pennsylvania law at issue—informed consent, a twenty-four hour waiting
period, parental notification, and recordkeeping and reporting requirements—were constitutional because they did not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy pre152
viability.
147. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
148. Id. at 845–46 (recognizing the following three principles: (1) a woman’s right to
have an abortion pre-viability absent interference from the state; (2) the state’s power to
restrict abortions post-viability; and (3) the state’s legitimate interest in protecting the
health of the woman and the life of the fetus “from the outset of the pregnancy”).
149. See id. at 872 (“The trimester framework no doubt was erected to ensure that the
woman’s right to choose not become so subordinate to the State’s interest in promoting
fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact. We do not agree, however, that
the trimester approach is necessary to accomplish this objective. A framework of this rigidity was unnecessary.”).
150. Id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s
ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
151. Id. at 871, 876 (acknowledging that cases decided after Roe concluded “that any
regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest,” but instead
reasoning that “[t]he very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life
leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted,” thus making “the undue burden standard . . . the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty”).
152. Id. at 881–88, 899–901; see also Rachel Rebouché, Comparative Pragmatism, 72 MD.
L. REV. 85, 95 & nn. 51–54 (2012) (“[T]he plurality upheld Pennsylvania’s requirements
for parental consent for a minor’s abortion, record keeping and reporting to the state, informed consent, and a twenty-four-hour waiting period.” (footnotes omitted)). A majority
of the Court, however, struck down the spousal notification requirement as imposing an
undue burden on a woman’s right to access an abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 889–98
(“Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of
governmental power . . . . These considerations confirm our conclusion that [the spousal
notification requirement] is invalid.”).
The plurality emphasized that, although a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy pre-viability, the state is not entirely prohibited from taking steps to ensure that the
woman’s choice is adequately informed. Id. at 872. For example, the plurality noted that
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In Gonzales v. Carhart, 153 the third case in the trio of abortion cases, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Partial154
In a majority opinion written by
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.
Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected a facial challenge to a federal
statute banning pre-viability partial birth abortions, known in the
medical community as intact dilation and evacuation (“intact D & E”),
dilation and extraction (“D & X”), and intact dilation and extraction
155
(“intact D & X”). As Justice Kennedy reasoned, “[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State
may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute
others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the
156
medical profession in order to promote respect for life.” In dissent,
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court’s opinion was “alarming” because it not only “tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to
ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain
cases,” but it also “blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey between previ157
ability and postviability abortions.” Since Roe, as the trio of abortion
cases suggests, the Supreme Court has permitted increased state intrusion into a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Lefemine v. Wideman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District
of South Carolina that law enforcement officers, who demanded that
anti-abortion protesters remove their graphic signs while conducting
an anti-abortion demonstration, were entitled to qualified immuni158
Because neither party challenged whether the defendants’ acty.
tions amounted to a content-based restriction on the protestors’
speech, the Fourth Circuit presumed that the defendants’ actions
159
On appeal,
were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
plaintiff Steven Lefemine “contend[ed] that the district court (1)
even in the preliminary stages of a pregnancy, “the State may enact rules and regulations
designed to encourage [the woman] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to
full term.” Id.
153. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
154. 218 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
155. Id. at 136, 167–68 (“Respondents have not demonstrated that the Act, as a facial
matter, is void for vagueness, or that it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to
abortion based on its overbreadth or lack of a health exception.”).
156. Id. at 158.
157. Id. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. 672 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012).
159. Id. at 297.
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erred in granting Defendants qualified immunity” and abused its discretion by (2) “failing to rule on Plaintiff’s request for declaratory re160
lief” and (3) “failing to award Plaintiff attorney’s fees.” Defendants’
sole argument on appeal was that the district court erred in granting
injunctive relief against named defendant Chief Deputy Mike Frederick because he “[wa]s no longer employed by the Greenwood County
161
The Fourth Circuit’s decision can be broken
Sheriff’s Office.”
down into four parts.
First, the Fourth Circuit began by addressing Lefemine’s argument that the district court erred in granting the defendants qualified
162
Lefemine argued that the officers violated a “clearly esimmunity.
tablished right” under the First Amendment and that any “reasonable
163
officer[] should have known that [his] actions violated that right.”
In response, the court noted that “[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity ‘protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
164
known.’” The court relied on the Supreme Court’s two-prong balancing test for determining whether the state is entitled to qualified
165
immunity. In determining whether a right was clearly established at
the time of its alleged infringement, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the right must be defined “‘in light of the specific context of the
166
case, not as a broad general proposition.’”
Still addressing qualified immunity, the Fourth Circuit then
turned to Lefemine’s assertion that the right should be considered in
167
The court rejected Lefemine’s argulight of the “heckler’s veto.”
ment, reasoning that such a broad construction would undoubtedly
upset the “interest-balancing” underpinning any qualified immunity

160. Id.
161. Id. at 303.
162. Id. at 297–301.
163. Id. at 297.
164. Id. at 297–98 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
165. Id. at 298. Quoting the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit observed that
“‘[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests—[(1)] the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and [(2)] the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Id. (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231).
166. Id. (quoting McKinney v. Richland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 431 F.3d 415, 417 (4th
Cir. 2005)).
167. Id. at 299. The Fourth Circuit has characterized the heckler’s veto as “‘the successful importuning of government to curtail offensive speech at peril of suffering disruptions
of public order.’” Id. at 299 n.3 (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir.
1985)).
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168

analysis. The court noted that while a clearly established right to be
free from certain restrictions on expression exists, the right to free
speech does not translate into a right to express any opinion or belief
169
at any public place at any time. The court acknowledged, however,
that any content-based restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a
170
Instead, the Fourth Circuit
compelling government interest.
framed the issue as whether “it was clearly established that law enforcement officers could not proscribe the display of large, graphic
171
photographs in a traditional public forum.”
The Fourth Circuit noted that, at the time when the incident occurred in 2005, precedent within both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court was unclear on this precise issue—namely, whether asking protesters in a public forum to remove “large, graphic” signs
172
constituted a proscribed infringement of First Amendment rights.
The court pointed out that “there was no clear holding concerning
whether such restrictions might be deemed content-based or content173
neutral,” which was “a sometimes difficult and thorny question.”
The Fourth Circuit did acknowledge, however, that the Supreme
Court has issued at least one opinion suggesting that certain restrictions on anti-abortion protest demonstrations may be deemed
174
content-neutral.
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to the defendants in their individual capacities
175
on qualified immunity grounds. The court clarified its decision by
emphasizing that the “Defendants believed they were acting in a content-neutral manner to safeguard legitimate, compelling government
176
To bolster its analysis, the court proffered two indeinterests.”
168. Id. at 299.
169. Id. at 299 n.4 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965)). The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the government is permitted to enforce and protect safety on public streets. Id. (citing Cox, 379 U.S. at 554–55).
170. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
171. Id. at 299.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Fourth Circuit observed that by 2005, at least two other circuit courts of
appeals “had found similar restrictions on large, graphic signs in heavily trafficked areas to
be content-neutral, not content-based.” Id. at 300 n.6 (citing Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police
Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2004); Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 641–
42 (9th Cir. 1998)).
174. See id. at 300 (“‘But the protection afforded to offensive messages does not always
embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it.
Indeed, it may not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate verbal or visual assault,
that justifies proscription.’” (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000))).
175. Id. at 301.
176. Id.
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pendent justifications for the defendants’ actions “even if [the court
accepts as true that the] Defendants should have been aware that they
were engaging in content-based restrictions, subject to strict scruti177
ny.” The Fourth Circuit concluded that, given the state of the law in
2005, it was not objectively unreasonable for defendants to believe
they could permit the continued protest and remove the graphic signs
both to protect the public from foreseeable traffic hazards and to pro178
tect minors from seeing the images.
The second part of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion addressed
Lefemine’s “argume[nt] that the district court abused its discretion by
179
Noting that
failing to rule on [his] request for declaratory relief.”
Lefemine was “awarded summary judgment on [his] request for a declaratory judgment that [the] Defendants’ actions were an unconstitutional infringement on [his] First Amendment rights,” the Fourth
Circuit could “discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
180
decision not to make the declaratory judgment more explicit.”
Third, the Fourth Circuit addressed Lefemine’s “argume[nt] that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to award [him] attor181
As the prevailing party, Lefemine argued he should
ney’s fees.”
“‘recover attorney’s fees unless special circumstances would render
182
[the fee] award unjust.’” The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court’s definition of “prevailing party” to conduct its abuse-of183
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged
discretion analysis.
that “‘to be considered a prevailing party . . . the plaintiff must be able
to’” highlight a change in “‘the legal relationship between itself and

177. See id. at 300 (describing the state’s “‘substantial and legitimate interest in traffic
safety’” and its “‘compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors’” (citations omitted)).
178. Id. at 300–01. The court observed that the case record supported this proposition,
as Chief Deputy Frederick had testified in his deposition that he was particularly concerned with “‘the combination of [the signs’] graphic nature and their proximity to the
roadway.’” Id. at 301 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 301–02.
180. Id. Specifically, the court observed: “The injunction issued by the district court
did not follow the language employed by Lefemine in its motion for summary judgment,
while the opinion and order concludes that Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were violated by [the] Defendants’ actions.” Id. at 302.
181. Id. at 302–03.
182. Id. at 302 (quoting People Helpers Fund, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 12 F.3d 1321,
1327 (4th Cir. 1993)).
183. Id. at 302–03. According to Supreme Court precedent, “‘plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue
in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.’”
Id. at 302 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
789 (1989)).
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184

the defendant.’”
The court concluded “that a judicial determination that a plaintiff’s civil rights had been violated, without more, was
insufficient” to qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party entitled to at185
The Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial of
torney’s fees.
attorney’s fees to Lefemine, concluding that the outcome of the litigation “‘ha[d] not altered the relative positions of the parties’” on two
grounds—(1) there was limited support for the proposition that
Lefemine was a prevailing party and (2) there were no other damages
186
awards.
The final part of the Fourth Circuit’s decision addressed the de187
fendants’ two interwoven contentions for cross-appeal. First, the defendants argued that “the district court erred in granting injunctive
relief against Chief Deputy Frederick, who [wa]s no longer employed
188
by the Greenwood County Sheriff’s Office.” Second, the defendants
argued that “the award of injunctive relief against each of them in
their individual capacities” should be dismissed as duplicative and
that “injunctive relief against them in their official capacities” should
189
also be dismissed. In dismissing the defendants’ individual and official capacities contentions, the court concluded that “[c]laims
190
for . . . injunctive relief are not affected by qualified immunity.”
Regarding the contention about former Chief Deputy Frederick, the
court reasoned that “injunctive relief against a state officer in his official capacity may be appropriate if ‘the complaint alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as pro-

184. Id. (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792).
185. Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 763 (1987)).
186. Id. at 303 (quoting People Helpers Fund, Inc., 12 F.3d at 1329). The Supreme Court
granted Lefemine’s petition for a writ of certiorari “to review the Fourth Circuit’s determination that he was not a prevailing party.” Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11
(2012). Disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that
Lefemine was a “prevailing party” because the legal relationship between the parties was
materially altered—“Before the ruling, the police intended to stop Lefemine from protesting with his signs; after the ruling, the police could not prevent him from demonstrating
in that manner. So when the District Court ‘ordered [d]efendants to comply with the
law,’ the relief given . . . supported the award of attorney’s fees.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). The Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further
proceedings to determine whether any “special circumstances” existed that would render
an award of attorney’s fees unjust. Id. at 11–12.
187. Lefemine, 672 F.3d. at 303–04.
188. Id. at 303.
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing Roller v. Cavanaugh, 984 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1993)); see also id.
(“The district court appears to have been analyzing whether Defendants might be liable
for damages, not whether they could be subject to an injunction in either their official or
individual capacities.”).
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191

spective.’” The court noted that even though Chief Deputy Frederick’s employment with the Greenwood County Sheriff’s Office may
have ceased, there remained a “‘cognizable danger of recurrent violation’” because he was “still a police officer, albeit elsewhere, in the
192
Having found “no abuse of discretion in
state of South Carolina.”
the district court’s decision to order [the] Defendants to . . . refrain
from impermissible content-based restrictions,” the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief against the de193
fendants.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Lefemine v. Wideman, the Fourth Circuit issued a four-part
holding, in which it determined that the defendant law enforcement
officers “were entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities” for violations of Lefemine’s First Amendment rights
on the grounds that “the specific rights at issue were not clearly estab194
lished at the time of the violations.” Neither party addressed the vi195
olation of Lefemine’s First Amendment rights on appeal, but the
Fourth Circuit nonetheless relied on an ambiguous body of case law
regarding the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
196
This conrestrictions on speech in its qualified immunity analysis.
fusion suggests that restrictions on constitutionally protected speech
in the anti-abortion protest context are not amenable to the standard
content-based versus content-neutral analysis—there appears to be no
conceptual space for content-neutral regulations due to the emotion197
Because the contentally charged nature of anti-abortion protests.
based versus content-neutral distinction sows judicial confusion over
the constitutionality of restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech,
courts should eliminate this initial inquiry and apply a single strict

191. Id. at 304 (citing Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002)).
192. Id. (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
193. Id.; see also id. (“In sum, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to [the] Defendants on grounds of qualified immunity, the denial of an award of attorney’s fees to Lefemine, and the grant of injunctive relief to Lefemine against [the] Defendants.”).
194. Id. at 295, 301. For a detailed explanation of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, see
supra Part III.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 159.
196. See infra Part IV.A. Part IV.A similarly discusses the district court’s improper reliance upon ambiguous jurisprudence concerning the distinction between content-based
versus content-neutral restrictions on speech.
197. See infra Part IV.B
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scrutiny standard to all government regulations targeted at these
198
forms of speech.
In addition, the proper analytical strategy for framing First
Amendment violations in the context of anti-abortion protests neces199
sitates calling upon Roe, Casey, and Gonzales, in which the Court has
permitted increased government interference into a woman’s personal
200
decision to terminate her pregnancy. This shift in the Court’s abortion jurisprudence should influence future Supreme Court decisions
addressing the constitutionality of government infringement on protected speech in this limited context. In light of the Supreme Court’s
recognition of the state’s legitimate interests in preserving maternal
health and potential human life, then, anti-abortion protesters’ First
Amendment rights must be given heightened recognition and protec201
tion under the U.S. Constitution.
A. The District Court and Fourth Circuit in Lefemine Relied on
Ambiguous Precedent Governing the Content-Neutral Versus ContentBased Distinction for Constitutional Restrictions on First Amendment
Speech
Relying on doctrinally “ambiguous” case law from the Fourth
Circuit and the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit in Lefemine reasoned that when the incident occurred between Lefemine and the defendants in 2005, there was no consistent and clear holding that addressed “whether asking demonstrators to remove [graphic antiabortion protest signs] would be an impermissible infringement of
202
their First Amendment rights.” The court even acknowledged that
deciding whether such restrictions were content-based or content203
204
neutral was a “thorny question.” The court cited Hill v. Colorado, a
Supreme Court case upholding the constitutionality of a “Colorado
statute that regulate[d] speech-related conduct within 100 feet of the
205
206
Inentrance to any health care facility,” as an analogous case.
deed, the Fourth Circuit construed Hill as standing for the proposi198. See infra Part IV.B.
199. See infra Part IV.C.
200. See supra Part II.D.
201. See infra Part IV.C.
202. Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 299 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds,
133 S. Ct. 9 (2012).
203. Id.
204. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
205. Id. at 707, 714.
206. See Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 300 (discussing Hill, which suggested that restrictions on
anti-abortion protest speech “might . . . be content-neutral” (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 716)).
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tion “that certain restrictions, even if made in response to the graphic and
offensive nature of images to the viewer, might still be deemed content207
neutral.”
The Supreme Court has noted that the proper inquiry for “determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the mes208
sage it conveys.” As Hill suggested, however, when determining the
“‘content neutrality’” of a statute, “[i]t is common in the law to examine the content of a communication to determine the speaker’s pur209
In addition, when balancing the right of protesters “to atpose.”
tempt to persuade others to change their views” against the right of
listeners to have “free passage in going to and from . . . a medical facility,” the Hill Court specifically stressed the public’s “interest in
210
avoiding unwanted communication.” In response, Justice Kennedy
noted in his dissenting opinion that as a result of the Court’s ruling in
Hill, “we learn today that citizens have a right to avoid unpopular
211
speech in a public forum.” As Justice Kennedy suggested, by legitimating the unwilling audience—an argument upon which the Fourth
212
Circuit similarly relied in Lefemine —the Hill Court appears to have
carved out a judicial caveat to what otherwise would have presumably
213
been a content-based restriction on protected speech.
In Lefemine, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, “even if [the] Defendants should have been aware that they were engaging in contentbased restrictions, subject to strict scrutiny,” the state may otherwise
be justified in restricting such speech through exercise of its police
214
As the Supreme Court established in Ward, however, the
powers.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added).
209. 530 U.S. at 719–21. But see id. (“With respect to the conduct that is the focus of
the Colorado statute, it is unlikely that there would often be any need to know exactly what
words were spoken in order to determine whether ‘sidewalk counselors’ are engaging in
‘oral protest, education, or counseling’ rather than pure social or random conversation.”).
210. Id. at 715–17.
211. Id. at 771 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. See Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 300 (discussing “‘speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it’” (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 716)).
213. See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to
Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1353 (2006) (“[T]he vagaries inherent in characterizing speech regulations as content-based versus contentneutral have resulted in standards for distinguishing between them that are applied in an
inconsistent and results-driven manner by the Court.”); see also id. at 1405 (“Imagine a lawyer attempting to explain to her pro-life client that the Court upheld the law in Hill primarily on the grounds that the restrictions on his ‘protests, education and counseling’
were not based on the content of his speech.”).
214. Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 300 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 715; Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463,
470 (4th Cir. 2003)). Specifically, the Lefemine court acknowledged that “this Court had
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government’s purpose, specifically, whether the government restricted the speech at issue because it disagreed with its message, is the
215
“controlling consideration” when determining content neutrality.
If a court may simply construe a government’s restriction as contentneutral, even when the restriction responds directly to the graphic nature of the particular message conveyed, then the foundation of First
Amendment jurisprudence will no doubt be threatened by this disingenuous application of a two-tiered content-based versus content216
neutral scheme.
In addition, the district court’s analysis in Lefemine, which more
extensively addressed the violation of Lefemine’s First Amendment
217
rights to freedom of speech and assembly, is troubling for two primary reasons— both of these reasons further illuminate the confusion
surrounding the two-tiered content-based versus content-neutral
scheme. First, in concluding that the defendants’ restrictions were
content-based, the court stated: “Despite [the] Defendants’ argument
that traffic safety was a compelling interest, in his conversation with
Lefemine, Major Smith did not mention traffic safety as his reason for
218
This statement reveals a conceswanting the graphic signs down.”
sion from the district court that if the defendants had been savvy in
how they framed their restriction to Lefemine—by merely stating that
the protesters were interfering with and endangering traffic safety—
then they might have been able to successfully argue that the restriction was content-neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scru219
tiny. It appears unlikely, however, that the district court would have
220
been so disingenuous as to intend or permit this result. Second, the
indicated in at least one anti-abortion protest case that ‘the State may act to protect its substantial and legitimate interest in traffic safety.’” Id. (quoting Lytle, 326 F.3d at 470).
215. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (2009).
216. Cf. McDonald, supra note 213, at 1407–08 (“[Hill] is the poster child, then, for a
deeply flawed free speech doctrine rather than a Court that took leave of its common
sense in calling the restriction at issue ‘content-neutral.’”).
217. See generally Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620–24 (D.S.C. 2010), aff’d,
Lefemine v. Wideman 672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 9
(2012).
218. Id. at 623.
219. Cf. McDonald, supra note 213, at 1406 (“It hardly needs pointing out that it is
normally not difficult to come up with a reasonable sounding content-neutral justification
for a regulation that is covertly designed to suppress certain expression. The [Supreme]
Court, moreover, is usually reluctant to question or inquire into the true motivations of its
co-equal branches of government, even if a predominant motive did exist that differed
from the asserted purpose for a regulation.”).
220. It appears that the only reference to a traffic safety argument from the defendants
came from the Incident Report Lt. Miles prepared after arriving at the scene of the
demonstration. See Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (“‘I told Mr. Lefemine that he would
have to quit using the blow horn while showing the photographs because it was disturbing
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district court rejected the defendants’ argument that their restriction
221
In
was not motivated by disapproval of Lefemine’s pro-life stance.
rejecting that argument, however, the district court’s analysis confused viewpoint and content neutrality in the same manner in which
the court proclaimed that the defendants had confused the distinction. For example, the district court noted that the speech restriction
at issue “was motivated solely based upon the content of the graphic
222
signs” —this statement suggests that the court in fact equated graphic content (depictions of aborted fetuses) with an implicit viewpoint
(opposition to abortion). The district court seems to have made this
determination in part because the defendants failed to sufficiently
223
Why, however, would the district
prove content-neutral concerns.
court concern itself with whether the defendants properly supported
their content-neutral concerns if viewpoint neutrality plays no part in
discerning content neutrality? It appears, therefore, that the district
court’s finding that the restriction on Lefemine’s speech was contentbased largely arose out of an implicit bias against the defendants’
viewpoint.

people and upsetting traffic flow.’” (citation omitted)). The district court noted that the
record was otherwise “devoid, however, of any evidence of car accidents, unusual or dangerous congestion, or any similar traffic concerns.” Id. As a result, the court “f[ou]nd[]
that traffic safety, under the facts of th[e] case, was not a compelling interest to justify
[the] Defendants’ restriction.” Id.
221. See id. at 621–22 (“While [the] Defendants contend that their restriction is content-neutral because it was not motivated by disapproval or disagreement with [Lefemine]’s pro-life stance, this argument confuses viewpoint neutrality with content neutrality.”). The district court relied on prior Supreme Court precedent to support the
proposition that viewpoint neutrality and content neutrality are not one and the same. See
id. at 621 (“The United States Supreme Court has consistently ‘rejected the argument that
viewpoint neutrality equals content neutrality.’” (quoting Capital Area Right to Life, Inc. v.
Downtown Frankfurt, Inc., 511 U.S. 1135, 1135 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting))). The
district court acknowledged that “‘content-neutral speech restrictions . . . are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Id. at 622 (quoting Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)); see also 1 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:9
(3d ed. 1996) (“A content-based regulation either explicitly or implicitly presumes to regulate speech on the basis of the substance of the message. A viewpoint-based law goes beyond mere content-based discrimination and regulates speech based upon agreement or
disagreement with the particular position the speaker wishes to express. Viewpoint discrimination is a subset of content discrimination; all viewpoint discrimination is first content discrimination, but not all content discrimination is viewpoint discrimination.” (footnotes omitted)).
222. Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (emphasis added).
223. See id. at 623 (“Despite [the] Defendants’ argument that traffic safety was a compelling interest, in his conversation with [Lefemine], Major Smith did not mention traffic
safety as his reason for wanting the graphic signs down. The record evidences that two citizens made complaints; however, neither complaint stated that the signs were interfering
with traffic.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra note 220.
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B. Discarding the Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Inquiry in
Favor of a Single Strict Scrutiny Standard Would Eliminate Judicial
Confusion and Promote Consistency for Courts Analyzing Future First
Amendment Violations in the Anti-Abortion Protest Context
The Supreme Court has carved out three categories to help
frame its analysis of First Amendment violations in different public lo224
cations, each of which warrants a different level of judicial scruti225
There should likewise be a judicially mandated categorical exny.
ception for anti-abortion protests that abolishes the content-neutral
226
The emotionally charged nature
versus content-based distinction.
of anti-abortion protests, combined with the difficulty in distinguishing the message from the restriction, has resulted in disparate application of the two-tiered scheme by the Supreme Court in many con227
In those cases before the Supreme Court that have upheld
texts.
certain restrictions on anti-abortion protesters, the dissenting Justices
have consistently characterized the regulations at issue as content- or
228
viewpoint-based, while the majority has characterized the regula224. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46
(1983) (articulating the public forum doctrine and describing the manner in which states
may impose restrictions on speech in each of three distinct categories of public property:
(1) the “quintessential public forum[],” namely “streets and parks which ‘have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions,’” (2) “public property which the state has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity,” and (3) “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication” (citations omitted)); see also Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802–04 (1985) (discussing “the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum” identified by the Perry Court).
225. For a general discussion of the relationship between the nature of the public forum and the level of judicial deference, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 88–94 (1987) (acknowledging that “existing doctrine divides public
property into three categories,” which may affect the standard of review and observing that
“it seems clear . . . that the [Supreme] Court does indeed apply different standards of review to public forums and nonpublic forums”).
226. Cf. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 615, 617 (1991) (“The [Supreme] Court, with the concurrence of most commentators, has interpreted content discrimination quite narrowly as involving a particular type of
government purpose served by the regulation of speech. It has, therefore, ignored other
types of content discrimination unrelated to the government’s purpose. This refusal to
recognize other types of content discrimination has resulted in the systematic underprotection of speech and serious doctrinal confusion.”).
227. See Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMMC’N. L. & POL’Y 131, 144 (2008) (noting that the majorities and
dissents in recent anti-abortion protest cases have reached different results by adopting
conflicting approaches and methodologies).
228. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 795 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“I think the injunction in the
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229

tions as content-neutral. As one scholar has so aptly noted, “the illdefined viewpoint and content concepts . . . make it even easier for a
justice’s ‘rooting interests’ to steer his or her decision in these cases
230
involving such divisive social issues.”
By removing the content-neutral versus content-based distinction
and applying a blanket standard of strict scrutiny to all restrictions on
anti-abortion protest speech, courts can begin the inquiry by looking
directly to the compelling government interest furthered by limiting
231
such speech. While Lefemine did not involve a speech-restricting injunction, the real danger is that any form of anti-abortion protest
speech “lends itself . . . to the targeted suppression of particular ide232
The unavoidable “targeting” problem makes it nearly impossias.”
ble to apply the two-tiered content-neutral and content-based scheme
in a meaningful manner. For example, the Madsen Court’s rewording of the intermediate scrutiny standard for content-neutral injunctions that restrict speech suggests that there is no conceptual
space for this two-tiered scheme in the anti-abortion protest con233
text. In addressing the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny
analysis, courts should apply a “totality of the circumstances” ap234
proach —this approach would enable courts to assess the value of
present case was content based (indeed, viewpoint based) to boot.”); cf. Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What is before us, after all, is a speech
regulation directed against the opponents of abortion, and it therefore enjoys the benefit
of the ‘ad hoc nullification machine’ that the Court has set in motion to push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored practice.”).
229. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763–65 (majority opinion) (determining that injunction
issued against a group of abortion protesters was content neutral because it was directed at
the group’s prior unlawful conduct, and thus was adopted without reference to the content of the speech); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 719–23 (majority opinion) (reasoning that the
Colorado law at issue was content neutral because (1) “it [wa]s not a ‘regulation of
speech,’” (2) “it [wa]s not adopted ‘because of disagreement with the message it conveys,’”
and (3) “the State’s interests in protecting access and privacy, and providing the police
with clear guidance, [we]re unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ speech”).
230. See Kozlowski, supra note 227, at 138.
231. For policies and reasons, supported by precedent, that favor subjecting speechrestricting injunctions to strict scrutiny, even where such restrictions are not contentbased, see Madsen, 512 U.S. at 790–800 (Scalia, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
232. See id. at 793 (referring to “a speech-restricting injunction”).
233. See id. at 765 (majority opinion) (“[W]hen evaluating a content-neutral injunction,
we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous.”);
id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that the “Court has left a powerful loaded weapon lying about today[,]” for “[t]he proposition that injunctions against speech are subject to a standard indistinguishable from . . .
the ‘intermediate scrutiny’ standard . . . ought to give all friends of liberty great concern”);
see also supra text accompanying notes 118–119.
234. As one scholar has noted, in assessing the constitutional value of speech, specifically “the degree of tailoring required,” one proposal for reform argues that “free speech

2013]

LEFEMINE v. WIDEMAN

1411

the suppressed speech and balance the multitude of interests at stake
without first pigeonholing these cases into the content-based or con235
tent-neutral camp. Finally, it is worth noting that a single strict scrutiny standard is appropriate in the anti-abortion protest context because it ensures that content-based regulations masquerading as
236
content-neutral regulations will not go unnoticed by the courts. Ultimately, a strict scrutiny standard would limit the possibility that a
court would reach an outcome-determinative decision.
Applying a blanket strict scrutiny standard does have its shortcomings. For example, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized that obscenity should not be afforded First Amendment protec237
In the context of anti-abortion protest speech then, at least
tion.
two possible caveats exist. On the one hand, a court could redirect
certain anti-abortion protest cases, particularly those involving the
display of aborted fetuses and other disturbing images, into the realm
of obscenity due to their objectively graphic nature. On the other
hand, a court may decide to afford weighty consideration to the gov238
In spite of arguments on
ernment’s interest in morals legislation.
cases are said to ‘involve the interaction of five variables: content, character, context, nature, and scope.’” R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech:
The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 358–59 (2006) (footnotes
omitted).
235. Cf. Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based
and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 808 (2004) (“I
suggest that by considering these five factors [of content, character, context, nature, and
scope], the [Supreme] Court should be able to estimate the value of the expression that is
being suppressed, and may then use that estimation of value to calibrate the quantum of
proof that the State must offer to justify the regulation of expression. The same five factors are also relevant in determining whether the law could be more narrowly tailored,
that is, less restrictive of expression.”).
236. Examples from other contexts suggest that the two-tiered content-based versus
content-neutral scheme has enabled courts to characterize truly content-based restrictions
as content-neutral ones to avoid heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49–53 (1986) (treating an ordinance that regulated the locations of adult entertainment theaters as content-neutral because the regulation targeted
only the secondary effects of such speech, and thus had only an incidental impact on protected speech).
237. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (“[W]e have today reaffirmed the basic holding of Roth v. United States that obscene material has no protection
under the First Amendment”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold
that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”).
238. As one scholar recently noted, however, many state and lower federal courts have
inconsistently interpreted the recent Lawrence Court’s sanctioning of morals legislation—
some courts argue that morals legislation is still a robust doctrine while other courts believe the Court’s decision in Lawrence marks a new era in the decline of morals legislation.
Cf. Manuel Possolo, Morals Legislation After Lawrence: Can States Criminalize the Sale of Sexual
Devices? 65 STAN. L. REV. 565, 566–67 (2013) (adopting the view that the Lawrence Court
appears to have embraced “a new, much more restrictive approach to morals legislation”).
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either side of the morals legislation debate, both the line of obscenity
and recent abortion cases appear to re-affirm the Court’s approval of
239
such legislation. For example, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the moral underpinnings of obscenity
law, reasoning that, “[i]n an unbroken series of cases extending over
a long stretch of this Court’s history, it has been accepted as a postulate that ‘the primary requirements of decency may be enforced
240
against obscene publications.’” Almost thirty-five years later, in Gonzales, the Court noted that “[t]he government may use its voice and its
regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within
241
While anti-abortion protesters’ views are seemingly
the woman.”
aligned with the government’s interest in respecting and protecting
242
the life within a woman, courts, however, may not be so lenient in
affording First Amendment protection to graphic and disturbing antiabortion protest displays.
When courts apply a blanket standard of strict scrutiny to all government restrictions in the anti-abortion protest context, this Note
proposes that the result should be a healthy balance between preserving the First Amendment right to free speech, on the one hand, and
respecting those recognized important government interests, on the
other hand. Eliminating the content-based versus content-neutral distinction will help extinguish judicial confusion and disparate out243
comes. This approach is certainly not infallible, as courts could still
redirect certain anti-abortion protest cases into the realm of obscenity, thus affording anti-abortion protesters limited First Amendment
protection. Nonetheless, it is an improvement that will allow for more
concrete guidance in the future.

239. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
240. Id. at 57 (citations omitted).
241. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
242. See supra Part II.D.
243. Cf. David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech
Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 196 (1987) (noting that under a “two-track approach, governmental regulations of the ‘content’ of protected speech appear to receive a higher level
of judicial scrutiny than do governmental regulations which are purportedly ‘contentneutral,’” and that the “two-track system, like any analytical model, does not perfectly describe the [Supreme] Court’s approach [because t]he Court has frequently strayed from a
strict application of the two-track system”).
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C. Roe, Casey, and Gonzales Establish a Useful Framework for
Understanding the First Amendment Rights of Anti-Abortion
Protesters
As Roe, Casey, and Gonzales suggest, increased state interference
with a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy has slowly erod244
ed a woman’s personal liberty in this arena. In the aftermath of Roe,
the plurality in Casey observed: “The very notion that the State has a
substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all
regulations must be deemed unwarranted[, meaning that n]ot all
burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will
245
For example, a plurality of the Casey Court upheld a
be undue.”
statutory provision that mandated a woman wait twenty-four hours after receiving information about the status of the fetus and about pos246
sible alternatives before choosing to terminate her pregnancy. Certainly, a woman could deem such information unwarranted and find
the waiting period to be an impermissible invasion of personal free247
dom and choice, but the Supreme Court has sanctioned this result.
If a state may curtail a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy for
the reasons set forth in Casey—arguably demoting a woman’s otherwise fundamental right to choose to terminate her pregnancy in the
interest of maternal health and potential human life—it would thus
be counterintuitive to restrict anti-abortion protest speech on these
same grounds.
V. CONCLUSION
In Lefemine v. Wideman, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision that law enforcement officers who restricted the
speech of anti-abortion protesters were entitled to qualified immuni248
This Note, however, addresses an issue that neither party adty.
dressed on appeal to the Fourth Circuit—the determination that the
249
The
defendants violated Lefemine’s First Amendment rights.
Fourth Circuit and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. District Court for the
244. See supra Part II.D.
245. 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
246. Id. at 881–87.
247. For example, the Casey plurality reasoned that by “attempting to ensure that a
woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate
purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an [un-informed] abortion.” Id. at
882. The plurality also suggested that the waiting period aligns the interests of the State
and the woman seeking the abortion by protecting the woman from the “devastating psychological consequences” of a decision that “was not fully informed.” Id.
248. See supra Part III.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 54, 159, 195.
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District of South Carolina relied on ambiguous precedent regarding
content-based versus content-neutral restrictions on protected
250
speech. This Note proposes that, because the two-tiered scheme for
determining the constitutionality of restrictions on anti-abortion protest speech promotes judicial confusion, courts should eliminate this
inquiry and apply a blanket standard of strict scrutiny to all re251
strictions on this type of speech. Roe, Casey, and Gonzales reflect the
narrowing of a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, which is
evident in decisions that permit increased state interference with this
252
right. Consistent with the permissible state interferences articulated
by the trio of abortion cases, anti-abortion protesters should likewise
253
be given greater latitude to disseminate their views to the public.

250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part IV.C.

